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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Waiter E. Moore appeals from the judgment entered upon re-sentencing.
On appeal he challenges the partial denial of his motion to prevent the
Department of Correction from considering a PSE.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
The state charged Moore with one count of lewd conduct with a child. (R.,
pp. 22-23.) He pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state
agreed to not file additional charges and to make specific sentencing
recommendations.

(R., pp. 28-30.)

The court ordered a psychosexual

evaluation. (R., pp. 35-37.) The report on the evaluation, conducted by North
Idaho Treatment Associates, Inc., was dated July 31, 2003, and submitted to the
district court with the PSI ("2003 PSE). (#30096 PSI.) As part of the evaluation
Moore signed a Psychosexua! Evaluation Agreement in which he was infor~med
that he had a right to not participate in the evaluation. (#30096 Psychosexual
Evaluation Agreement.) The district court sentenced Moore to life with 15 years
fixed. (R., pp. 53-55.) The sentence was affirmed on appeal. State v. Moore,
2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 477, Docket No. 30096 (Idaho App., 2004).
Moore was granted post-conviction relief for his counsel's failure to inform
him of his right to not participate in the PSE. (R., pp. 68-69.) Despite Moore's
apparent belief that his first psychosexual was conducted in violation of his right
to not participate in the evaluation, he underwent a second psychosexual
evaluation. (R., pp. 74-75, 93.) Included with the PSI for his new sentencing

was the 2003 PSE. (PSI.) Also provided to the court was the new PSE ("2009
PSE"). The district court, however, sealed the original PSI and 2003 PSE, did
not consider them in the re-sentencing, and ordered that they not be forwarded to
the Department of Correction.' (Tr., p. 10, L. 3 - p. 12, L. 19; R., p. 109.) The
court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to order the Department of
Correction to take any particular action regarding any documents or information
already in its possession. (Tr., p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 5.) The court also stated
as a ground for partially denying the motion that the right involved was the Fifth
Amendment right to silence and that a lot of the information Moore was seeking
to deny the Department was unrelated to the "issue that ultimately has resulted in
this resentencing." (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 6-19.)
The district court sentenced Moore to life with 13 years fixed. (R., pp.
116-17.) Moore filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 119-23.)

' The district court also sealed a 2008 PSI because it had been conducted
without Moore's counsel being physically present for the interview. (Tr., p. 4, L.
16-p. 6, L. 24; p. 12, Ls. 13-19.)

ISSUES
Moore states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Moore's motion to
1)
remove the 2003 PSI from the possession of the IDOC?
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a
2)
unified sentence of life, with thirteen years fixed, upon Mr. Moore,
following his guilty plea to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
in light of the mitigating factors present in his case?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1
Has Moore filed to show error in the district court's order because he
wasn't entitled to even have the district court disregard the 2003 PSI, much less
entitled to have the Department of Correction do so?

Has Moore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when
2.
it imposed a sentence of life with 13 years fixed upon Moore's conviction for lewd
conduct with a child?

ARGUMENT
I.
Moore Has Failed To Show Error Because He Was Not Entitled To Have The
2003 PSI Disreqarded Bv Anvone

A.

Introduction
The district court sealed the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE and declined to

consider them in sentencing. (Tr., p. 10, L. 3

- p.

12, L. 19; R., p. 109.) The

district court did not order the Department of Correction to take any particular
action regarding any documents or information already in its possession for two
reasons.

First, it concluded it lacked discretion to order the Department of

Correction to take any particular action regarding the information in these
documents. (Tr., p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 5.) Second, it concluded that at least
most of the materials in the documents subject to the objection did not actually
implicate any Fifth Amendment rights. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 6-19.)
On appeal Moore challenges only the first of the bases for the district
court's ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-1 1.) Because he does not challenge the
holding that there was no Fifth Amendment violation that would justify the
requested relief, this Court must affirm on that unchallenged basis. If this Court
reaches the merits of that issue, review of the law shows that there was no Fifth
Amendment violation, and therefore no grounds for withholding the information in
the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE from the Department of Correction. Finally, Moore's
appellate argument fails because he has cited to nothing that would give the
district court the discretion to remove information in the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE
from the Department of Correction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). The appellate
courts exercise free review of constitutional issues. State v. Casey, 125 ldaho
856, 876 P.2d 138 (1994).
C.

This Court Should Affirm On The Alternative Basis Provided Bv The
District Court Because That Basis Is Not Challenaed On Appeal
Where the district court makes a ruling based upon more than one ground,

and an appellant challenges only one of those grounds, the appellate court must
affirm the district court on the uncontested basis for its ruling. State v. Goodwin,
131 ldaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). Because the record
shows that Moore has not challenged the district court's alternative basis for its
ruling, he has failed to show error.
In ruling on Moore's motion, the court stated that "the presentence
investigation contains a lot of information, some of which is totally and completely
unrelated to the critical issue that ultimately has resulted in this resentencing. So

I don't feel that I'm inclined to do anything other than to make sure that we seal
the [2003 PSI] and we'll make sure that's sealed and is not forwarded to the
Department of Corrections, as I typically would in these cases." (Tr., p. 13, 1s. 618.) Because this basis for the district court's ruling is not challenged on appeal,
this Court must affirm on the alternative basis that there is no underlying Fifth
Amendment violation that would merit denying the Department of Correction

access to information in the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE already in the Department's
possession.
In addition, there has never been any finding in this record of any Fifth
Amendment violation.

On the contrary, the re-sentencing was ordered

exclusively on the Sixth Amendment ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., pp. 68-69.) The remedy granted Moore was a resentencing. (Id.) That

remedy is entitled to be considered res judicata.

State v. Rhoades, 134

Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481,482 (2000) (the doctrine of res judicata prevents relitigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or
decision in an action between the same litigants). Because Moore already has
been granted a remedy for the ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to
show that he was entitled to an additional remedy.
The district court concluded that there was no indication that restricting the
use of the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE was necessary to address any Fifth
Amendment issue.

Moore has not challenged this conclusion.

In addition,

Moore has failed to argue or cite authority for the proposition that, as a result of
his counsel's ineffective assistance for failing to inform him of his right against
compelled self-incrimination, he is entitled to an additional remedy beyond that
already granted in the form of a re-sentencing.

Because Moore has not

challenged the district court's alternative basis for its holding, he has failed to
show error.

D.

Moore Has Failed To Show Anv Violation Of His Riqht Aqainst Com~elled
Self-Incrimination Or That Restriction On The Use Of The 2003 PSI Or
2003 PSE Would Flow From ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Even if the merits of the court's alternative holding were to be considered,

Moore has failed to show that he would be entitled to prevent consideration of the
2003 PSI and 2003 PSE by the Department of Correction. On the contrary, he
had already been granted the only remedy to which he was entitled.
Moore has failed to show any violation of his right against compelled selfI
I

incrimination. "The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prevents a person from being
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."

State

I

v. Curless, 137 ldaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002). The Fifth
Amendment speaks of compulsion, and thus does not preclude a witness from
testifying voluntarily in matters that may incriminate him or her. Minnesota v.
Mur~hv,465 U.S. 420,427 (1984). Therefore, in order to enjoy the protections of
the Fifth Amendment, an individual must generally assert the privilege by
remaining silent. Id_ In cases such as this one, where the defendant did not
remain silent, the application of one of two exceptions must be shown. Id_
The first exception applies to custodial interrogations.

"In those

circumstances, the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of incriminating
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being [Mirandized]." Curless, 137
ldaho at 145, 44 P.3d at 1198 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
This rule applies, however, only when the interrogation is in a "police-dominated
atmosphere." Illinois v. Perkins 496 U.S. 292, 295 (1990) (citing Miranda, 384

U.S. at 445). This exception does not apply to Moore's case because there is no
indication that the psychosexual evaluation was performed in a "policedominated atmosphere."
The second exception applies where assertion of the privilege "is
penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent, and compel a witness
to give incriminating testimony." Curless, 137 Idaho at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198
(citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984)). As noted, Moore was
informed that he was under no obligation to undergo the PSE.

(#30096

Psychosexual Evaluation Agreement.) In the context of future parole (the context
under which the 2003 PSE would be considered by the Department of
Correction), loss of prison privileges as a result of refusal to take part in a
rehabilitative program that would require the defendant to admit guilt for the
crime for which he was convicted as well as to give a full accounting of prior
sexual activity (including crimes) does not constitute coercion under the Fifth
Amendment. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-45 (2002). There is nothing in the
record indicating that Moore was "compelied" as prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. The order setting up the PSE contains nothing either mandating
cooperation or penalizing Moore for any lack thereof. (R., pp. 35-37.)
The record in this case does not support any claim that the 2003 PSE was
taken in derogation of Moore's Fifth Amendment rights against compelled selfincrimination. The record does not show that Moore has ever even claimed that
the 2003 PSE resulted from compelled self-incrimination. The only violation of
Moore's rights was an Estrada violation (R., p. 68), meaning a violation of

Moore's right to effective assistance of counsel. _See Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho
558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Moore has failed to show that there was any violation
of the Fifth Amendment such that the Department of Correction would be barred
from considering the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE.
Moore has also failed to show that preventing the Department of
Correction from making use of the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE would be a proper
remedy for the Esfrada violation. As noted above, the remedy granted, a resentencing, has become res judicafa. in addition, the remedy granted in Estrada
was a re-sentencing. Estrada, 143 ldaho at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. Finally, the
concern of the Court in Estrada was that the psychosexual evaluation would be
used to enhance the sentence.

Id. at 564,

149 P.3d at 839. Moore failed to

demonstrate to the district court (or on appeal) that prohibiting the Department of
Correction from reviewing the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE was a proper remedy for
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform Moore of his right to silence
vis-a-vis the 2003 PSE.
Because Moore failed to establish any basis for his motion that the
Department of Correction be prohibited from reviewing or relying on the 2003 PSI
or 2003 PSE, Moore has failed to show error in the district court's ruling that it
would not so order.

E.

Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Had Discretion To
Order The Department Of Correction To Disreaard The 2003 PSI Or 2003
PSE
Moore argwes
- that I.C.R. 32(h)(l) confers discretion on the district court to

require the Department of Correction to return the PSI. (Appellant's brief, pp. 57.) This argument is without merit.
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted
according to its plain language, and that where the language is plain the court will
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State Department of Health and
Welfare v. Housei, 140 ldaho 96, 103, 90 P.3d 321, 328 (2004); State v.
Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128
ldaho 362,365,913 P.2d 578,581 (1996); Roe v. Hopper, 90 ldaho 22,27,408
P.2d 161, 166 (1965); Koon v. Bottolfsen, 66 ldaho 771, 169 P.2d 345 (1946);
Burnham v. Henderson, 47 ldaho 687, 278 P. 221 (1929). Likewise, rules of
procedure are to be given meaning according to their plain language. See State

v. Bottens, 137 ldaho 730,732, 53 P.3d 875, 877 (Ct. App. 2002).
The relevant language of the applicable procedural rule is that the PSI
"shall be available to the ldaho Department of Corrections so long as the
defendant is committed to or supervised by the Department ...." I.C.R. 32(h)(l)
(emphasis added). The plain language of this rule does not grant discretion to
the court; on the contrary it makes availability of the PSI mandatory. Moore's
argument that I.C.R. 32(h)(l) granted the court discretion to decide whether the
2003 PSI was available to the Department of Correction is without merit on its
face.

II.
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a life sentence with 13 years fixed upon

Moore's conviction For lewd conduct with a child.

(R., pp. 116-17.) Moore

contends the district court abused its discretion because it "failed to adequately
consider" Moore's lack of a criminal record; his claim of having taken full
responsibility for his actions; and his efforts at education and training while in
prison. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-14.) A review of the record shows Moore has
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.
C.

Id.

Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencinq
Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the

sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
Moore repeatedly sexually abused the six-year-old son of his niece while
providing day-care for the child. (PSI, pp. 1-2.)
Based on police reports and victim statements, Mr. Moore
performed fellatio on his six-year-old victim on multiple occasions
and photographed his victim white engaged in sexual acts. The
police report indicates that they found several child pornographic
videotapes and several envelopes containing computer printouts of
small nude children. They also reported finding a Rubbermaid
container containing several pair of small underwear on which were
written the names and ages of children.
(213109 PSE, p. 5.) He probably also molested the victim's four-year-old brother.
(Tr., p. 29, L. 24 - p. 33, i. 2.)
Moore refused to discuss the facts of the case with the evaluator. (213109
PSE, p. 5.) In testing, Moore's responses to the Sexual Adjustment Inventory
suggested that "he is deliberately minimizing his problems and concerns ...."
(213109 PSE, p. 6.)

He was diagnosed with "Pedophilia Attracted to Males,

Nonexclusive type" with "Obsessive Compulsive Personality Features." (213109
PSE, p. 3.) The polygraph report indicated deception to questions about whether
there were other victims he had not disclosed; whether there were undisclosed
sexually deviant behaviors; and whether he was lying about the number of
individuals he had sexually abused.

(1130109 Polygraph Report.)

The

psychosexual examiner concluded: "Mr. Moore's level of risk is high enough to
require close monitoring of his behavior and therapeutic intervention. It is this
evaluator's opinion that at the discretion of the court Mr. Moore should be kept
under sex offender supervision for as long a time as possible." (2131098 PSE, p.

13.)
The district court in sentencing specifically considered Moore's character,
the nature of the offense, and the sentencing factors, especially protection of the
community.

(Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-20.)

The court characterized the crime as

"egregious" given the young age of the victim. (Tr., p. 44, L. 21

- p. 45, L. 4.)

Given the vulnerability of children, protection of the community was a special
consideration. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-1 5.) The crime was also very serious due to the
harm caused the victim. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 18-23.)
The court considered the risk of future offense, finding the risk
"substantial" if Moore did not rehabilitate. (Tr., p. 47, L. 24 - p. 48, L. 19.) The
court was concerned by the deception result of the polygraph, but noted that
such deception was "not that uncommon" give the "magnitude of the problem."
(Tr., p. 48, L. 20

- p. 49, L.

I.) The court recognized the need for "intensive

treatment" before Moore would be able to be released back into society. (Tr., p.

49, Ls. 19-25.)
In choosing the particular sentence, the court concluded that the
seriousness of the crime would be diminished by a lesser sentence. (Tr., p. 50,
Ls. 2-5.)

A long period of supervision to assure the level and type of

programming necessary to protect society was also deemed necessary. (Tr., p.

50, Ls. 5-15.) The court thereupon imposed and executed a sentence of life with
13 years fixed. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 16-21.)
Moore argues that his claims that he was physically and sexually abused
as a child show an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.)

Moore

asserted in the PSI, however, that his parents "took great care" of him and his
siblings and are "very supportive of him." (PSI, p. 4.)

He claimed only one

incidence of physical abuse. (Id.) He stated that it is "possible" he was molested
because his brother was molested by a family friend. (Id.) Although he did claim
during his polygraph interview to have been victimized once by an older boy, he
also ultimately tested deceptive in relation to his sexual history.

(1130109

Polygraph Report.) Moore has failed to show that the district court misperceived
his character when imposing sentence. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-16.)
Moore next argues that that the "district court failed to adequately
consider" his lack of a prior criminal record. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) The district
court specifically considered this, however, noting that there was nothing there
"other than this offense." (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-7.) This argument is belied by the
record.
Finally, Moore points out his claims of remorse and rehabilitation.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14.)

Again, however, the district court specifically

considered as "positive things" Moore's stated remorse and claimed desire to
pursue treatment. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 5-19.) Moore's argument is again affirmatively
disproved by the record.

Moore has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion. Moore committed a horrendous crime of abusing a very young child
and there is a great deal of evidence that there have been other victims,
including child pornography and "trophies." The court weighed both the need to
protect society and the possibility of rehabilitation and concluded that a period of
incarceration of 13 years was required to avoid minimizing the crime, while the
indeterminate period of life offered the possibility of rehabilitation with
supervision. The sentence is reasonable under all the facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 26th day of April 2
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